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Who Engineered the Anti-Japanese 
Protests in 2005?
Yue-him Tam
I. The Problem
On April 9, 2005, an estimated 20,000 Chinese protestors surrounded 
the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, attacking it with rocks and shout-
ing anti-Japanese slogans. Thousands more expressed their anger in 
other parts of the capital and damaged some Japanese retail stores 
and restaurants. Quickly The New York Times identified this event as 
the “largest to be held in the capital since a massive outpouring [of] 
anti-American sentiment in 1999, after the United States bombed Chi-
na’s embassy in Belgrade during the war against Serbia.”1 Anti-Japa-
nese demonstrations also occurred in Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and other cities in early April. The protesters 
demanded that Japan openly acknowledge her history of aggression 
in China and other parts of the Asia Pacific region prior to and dur-
ing World War II. To this end, the protesters called for a boycott of 
Japanese goods. The mass demonstrations ended in late April, when 
the government started to arrest some protesters and close down their 
websites.2
After the demonstrations, the anti-Japanese campaign moved on. 
From April to June, the Chinese actions climaxed in a massive online 
citizens’ campaign that gathered over 42 million signatures opposing 
Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. The 
Chinese government did not stop the signature campaign. In early 
April, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao openly urged Japan to “face up” 
to its wartime history. He hinted that China would not endorse Japan’s 
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bid saying, “Only a country that respects history, takes responsibility 
for history and wins over the trust of peoples in Asia and the world 
at large can take greater responsibilities in the international commu-
nity.”3 In October, as a response to the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
by Japanese Premier Junichiro Koizumi and 100-some Japanese law-
makers, the Chinese government cancelled the visit of Japan’s Foreign 
Minister and abruptly sent home a delegation of Japanese political and 
business leaders. Japan reacted strongly against the Chinese actions.4 
The result of these and other nationalistic events in Japan and China 
distressed their already troubled relationship, tumbling it to the lowest 
point since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972.
Who engineered the protests? What motivated those widespread 
anti-Japanese demonstrations in China? What were the protesters driv-
ing at? Why did the demonstrations take place in the spring of 2005? 
Many Japanese politicians blamed the Chinese government for stoking 
nationalism against Japan for political gain. Shinzo Abe, now Premier 
and then Acting Secretary-General of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), declared that “deepening social inequality was behind the 
anti-Japanese protests.” He claimed, “Beijing was using Japan as an 
outlet to vent that anger.”5 Echoing Abe’s claim, Murray Scot Tanner, 
Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, testified at a pub-
lic hearing in Washington, D.C. that he believed the Chinese govern-
ment was behind the demonstrations. He labeled the government’s 
permissive attitude as “a disturbing trend.” He warned the Chinese 
government, “By aligning itself tacitly with the protesters (notwith-
standing its public calls for restraint), it risks having its policies boxed-
in or manipulated by protestor demands.” Furthermore, he predicted, 
“whereas the Belgrade bombing was in many ways a one-time event 
in which popular anger was likely to cool later, China’s disagreements 
with Japan have both a longer history and an indefinite future.”6
For many critics, the Chinese government engineered the demon-
strations. They did not believe that the protesters’ call for respect of 
history was real. The anti-Japanese demonstrations were viewed as a 
political or diplomatic conspiracy devised by the Chinese government, 
in which Japan was used as a scapegoat to whitewash the mounting 
social and political problems in China. Indeed, some Western journal-
ists and political commentators openly displayed their contempt for 
the Chinese protests. Eric Margolis, a New York-based foreign corre-
spondent, defense analyst, and columnist, reprimanded the Chinese 
in early May 2005: “Chinese usually rank among the world’s more 
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intelligent people, but lately the red mandarins who run the People’s 
Republic have been doing some seriously un-intelligent things.” He 
demanded, “It’s time to end using World War II as a political weapon 
or a means of extorting money and trade or political concessions from 
the vanquished. In WWII, no one’s hands were clean. Forgive and for-
get.”7
These critics have hypothetically attributed the anti-Japanese cam-
paign in the spring of 2005 to the old cliché that since China is not a 
democratic country, its “red mandarins” are always in absolute control 
to do “unintelligent things.” The Chinese victims and their kin should 
“forgive and forget” because their hands are “just as unclean” as the 
Japanese perpetrators during the war. The victims’ call for respecting 
history and reconciliation with the Japanese is understood as propa-
ganda. As such, the anti-Japanese demonstrations have to be necessar-
ily engineered by the “red mandarins” for their political and diplomatic 
gains. The buses available at some demonstration sites to take the pro-
testors home are taken as evidence showing the stage-management 
of the “red mandarins.” The police’s restrained use of force to break 
up the demonstrations and to protect Japanese property is taken as 
evidence to show the government endorsement of violence against the 
Japanese. In sum, many critics in Japan and the West did not under-
stand the Chinese protestors’ call for respecting history properly. They 
are merely seen as political or diplomatic tools of the government. 
Their fundamental question concerning the respect for history remains 
essentially unnoticed and unaddressed.
In this essay I will try to look at the protests from the perspective of 
the protesters. I will examine their grievances and sentiments. By way 
of visiting their websites or blogs and conducting personal interviews, 
I argue that their collective call for respect of history is real and that 
the Chinese government did not engineer the demonstrations. The 
demonstrations can be considered the Chinese response to the insensi-
tive and irresponsible views of some Japanese leaders about Imperial 
Japan’s war crimes and atrocities in Asia. It should be noted that my 
argument does not preclude other hypotheses about the causes of the 
protests. A multitude of explanations must necessarily be employed in 
any coherent account of the causes of an event that is so fundamentally 
fragmented and controversial in its narrative.
This essay will focus on the demonstrations from within. Accord-
ingly, I will examine the factors leading to the Chinese anger. I will 
then turn to an examination of the protesters’ mentality and rationale 
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for their actions. Finally, I will discuss a few significant elements in 
the anti-Japanese campaign in 2005, trying to see a full picture of the 
incidents.
II. The Origins of the Chinese Anger
Several incidents can be identified as the immediate origins of the 
Chinese anger in the spring of 2005. In the early spring the Japanese 
government approved the publication of the new edition of a contro-
versial history textbook, first published in 2001 by the Japanese Society 
for History Textbook Reform. One of the avowed aims of the new 
textbooks is to encourage Japanese nationalism and pride in Japan’s 
wartime history. It whitewashes Japanese war crimes, including the 
Nanjing Massacre, the sexual slavery (“Comfort Women”) system, the 
biochemical warfare, and the inhumane treatment of Western prison-
ers of war and Chinese forced laborers. The new textbook dismisses 
Japanese wartime atrocities as the product of Chinese fabrication or 
propaganda. It conveys the message that Japan sacrificed herself for 
the liberation of Asia from Western imperialism during World War II. 
The atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki made Japan 
the true victim of the war. The post-war Tokyo Tribunal, which tried 
General Tojo Hideki and other top Japanese war criminals, represents 
little more than the victor’s justice.
To ward off the mounting social and political tensions stemming 
from the extended economic stagnation beginning in the 1990s, Pre-
mier Koizumi and his administration sought to stoke nationalism in 
Japan. In spite of strong protests at home and from abroad, Koizumi 
pointedly and repeatedly visited the Yasakuni Shrine, where convicted 
Japanese war criminals were enshrined. While Koizumi defends his 
visits as a way to pray for peace, the Chinese and other Asians take 
them as a senseless offense.8 The Chinese ask how the Jewish people 
would react if the German Chancellor paid tribute at Hitler’s tomb. 
On a different front, to secure support from the Bush administration, 
Koizumi contributed not only funds but also troops to the war in Iraq, 
which has remained a constitutional issue in Japan. In early 2005 Koi-
zumi went a step further. He sought to void the pacifist clause in Arti-
cle 9 of Japan’s Constitution that limits Japan’s military activities to the 
country’s immediate defense. The Chinese fear that the change in the 
pacifist Constitution would lead to a military build up in Japan, which 
would become a major security concern in East Asia.
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The Chinese found new and pragmatic grounds for concern in 
early April 2005, when the Koizumi administration officially allowed 
Japanese companies to begin drilling oil and natural gas in an area 
of the East China Sea that is in dispute between the two countries. 
Immediately Beijing protested and declared that it “retains the right to 
take further action” over the drilling.9 The territorial dispute over the 
Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands can be traced back to the early 1970s. But 
both sides have refrained from taking aggressive action until the Koi-
zumi administration’s authorization occurred in April 2005.
There were other incidents that caused sensational uproars in China. 
Suffice it to mention the Japanese sex tour in Zhuhai, a southern coastal 
city, in 2003. It is reported that a group of 380 male staff from one Japa-
nese company checked into the International Conference Center Hotel 
on the evening of September 17 for prostitute shopping. “Some 500 
prostitutes later crowded the public areas of the hotel, in full view of 
other guests, and an orgy-style party ensued that continued past mid-
night.”10 The Chinese were particularly offended that the mass orgy 
took place on the eve of the 72nd anniversary of the Manchurian Inci-
dent on September 18, 1931, which marked the start of Japan’s massive 
invasion of China.
Finally, I would like to cite the Japanese bid in early 2005 for a per-
manent seat in the United Nations Security Council as a special ral-
lying force for the concerned Chinese, both at home and abroad. As 
Japan’s bid was expected to be debated at the United Nations in the 
summer, a sense of urgency in expressing their opposition was felt by 
the Chinese activists throughout the world. As a response, a signature 
campaign was launched worldwide in early April by the Global Alli-
ance for Preserving the History of WWII in Asia (GA), which is a grass-
roots and scholarly organization based in San Francisco. The response 
from China was particularly enthusiastic. On June 30, 2005, on behalf 
of the sponsoring organizations, the GA submitted to U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan a petition with 42 million signatures collected 
in 41 countries. They demanded that Japan be denied a permanent 
seat on the U.N. Security Council before it acknowledges its crimes 
in World War II, makes a sincere apology, and gives compensation to 
the victims. They further demanded that Japan not distort the historic 
truth in their textbooks. In the process of the signature campaign, the 
GA and its supporters publicized the utmost details of Japanese war 
crimes and the Koizumi administration’s militaristic tendency. As a 
result, many protesters, including Wan Ping, a Tsinghua University 
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student in Beijing, said that “Japan is not ready to be on the Security 
Council if it lies to its people about history.”11
III. The Demonstrations Viewed from Within
I will now examine the behaviors and aspirations of the protesters 
through personal writings found in their blogs, where people can 
express their ideas and sentiments casually. It is unfortunate that—per-
haps due to security concerns—there are few blogs in Chinese that 
carry detailed descriptions of the demonstrations in 2005. I have found, 
however, a few blogs in English that are helpful in understanding the 
demonstrations and the protesters.
A. Beijing
I will begin with the narrative of the demonstration in Beijing on April 
9, 2005, found in the blog entitled, “A Swede and A Beijinger.” The 
blogger is a 31-year-old Swede known as Johan, who was a graduate 
student working on his master’s thesis while studying in Beijing.12 
Johan and his Chinese friend participated in the demonstration as 
observers, who cautiously tried to maintain a distance from the pro-
testers.13 Johan and his friend started their tour in Hailong Dasha at 
Zhongguancun around 9:30 a.m. They followed the protesters to all 
the major locations, including the Japanese Embassy, where they wit-
nessed vandalism until the demonstration ended around 6:00 p.m. 
Johan’s statement is thus a complete record of the demonstration in 
Beijing. He posted his statement shortly after 7:00 p.m. the same day, 
making it a fresh personal account of the event.
Johan was impressed with the following observations. First, the 
demonstration was largely orderly, because the demonstrators often 
followed the directives of the police. “These guys [the demonstrators] 
at the front were constantly told by the police when to stop, when to 
walk, etc. The march was at this point confined to one side of the street 
with policemen casually walking in front of them and 20–25 police 
minivans tightly following them…On the other side of the road people 
stopped and cheered and honked their horns in their cars.” He also 
noted the orderly ending of the event around 6:00 p.m. “The students 
get into busses and go back to their universities. Half an hour later 
the place was basically cleared. The students left voluntarily with-
out fuzz.” Second, vandalism was mild. On the popular commercial 
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Zhongguangcun Avenue, Johan describes, “Some torn advertisements 
of Canon Powershot. Some torn advertisement, a hole in the panel of 
a small branch of a Japanese bank, and the stones at the embassy, was 
all the vandalism I saw, and I think that covers it all in this aspect.” 
Johan saw some demonstrators throwing stones at the guardhouse of 
the Japanese Embassy. But he stressed that, “the embassy was sealed 
off by layers of riot-gear equipped guards. They were never challenged 
in any way by the protesters and police were casually walking among 
the protesters and even the stone throwers!” Third, Johan complained 
about the police for not doing more to stop vandalism entirely. “It is 
pretty sad to see police standing by watching [vandalization]. They 
could very easily stop this by just telling them [the protesters] to.” 
Fourth, Johan found it ironical that many protesters were using Japa-
nese cameras to take pictures while they were calling for a boycott 
of Japanese goods. “The whole thing was very well documented by 
spectators and protesters, mostly with cameras such as Sony, Canon, 
Panasonic, etc. That didn’t seem to bother anyone.” Finally, in his con-
cluding remarks, Johan criticized the usual exaggeration found in the 
foreign media’s reporting of the demonstration. The foreign reporters 
tended to produce “a large focus on the smashed window, therefore 
sounding more aggressive than it actually was.” He also noted that 
the numbers in these reports were often inaccurate. Johan complained, 
“This is also the case when it comes to the reported numbers, often 
citing the highest numbers available, while this was not a very large 
demonstration.”
B. Shanghai
The narrative about the demonstration in Shanghai on April 16, 2005 
was found in Mark Wang’s blog entitled, Ryu2.mind (http://www.
markwang.com/log). As the blogger’s profile is unavailable, I only 
know that Mark is a young Chinese American visiting in Shanghai as 
a researcher in 2005. Like Johan in Beijing, Mark was an observer, not a 
fervent participant in the demonstration. “Japan is a country near and 
dear to my heart,” he confessed. He spoke some Japanese, had many 
Japanese friends, and had worked for a Japanese company for some 
time. He did not have any anti-Japanese sentiment, nor did he fully 
endorse the demands of the Chinese protesters. His participation was 
purely to satisfy his curiosity in seeing an unusual event.14 Mark and 
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his friend started the tour at 9:00 a.m. at the People’s Square Station 
and finished it when the demonstration ended in the late afternoon.
Mark found the demonstration relatively peaceful and orderly. He 
remarks, “Despite reports of isolated violence and vandalism, the 
group we were with was rather peaceful. There was chanting: ‘Boycott 
Japanese goods!’ ‘Protest Japan!,’ ‘Return the Diaoyu Islands!,’ ‘Koi-
zumi resign!,’ and variants thereof were the most popular.” Mark con-
tinued to describe the demonstration in action, “When we were at a 
loss for words, someone would break out singing the national anthem 
(written during the 1930s and whose lyrics refer to resisting the—Japa-
nese, of course—enemy), and invariably, everyone would join in.” The 
most violent action he saw was the harassing of drivers of Japanese 
cars. People spit at these vehicles or threw plastic bottles at them. 
“Some people wanted to throw rocks, but our leaders told them—‘No, 
no, don’t throw rocks! Let’s be civilized…” But Mark was disheartened 
to see the devastating look of the Japanese Consulate after vandalism. 
“Besides [it] looking like a Cubist piece of abstract art with paint splat-
ters, windows were broken, and bottles and eggs were flying every-
Figure 1: The second group of the demonstrators starts marching from the People’s 
Monument in the Bun, via Shandong First Road, reaching Yan’an Road in Shanghai. 
(All photos via courtesy of the China Daily)
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Figure 2: The consolidated rally, consisting of many smaller groups, marching along 
Yan’an Road.
Figure 3: Working youths from areas outside of Shanghai driving their vehicles to 
scenes to render their support to the demonstrators.
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Figure 4: Angry demonstrators overturning a parked Japanese car.
Figure 5: The demonstrators stepping and ransacking the overturned Japanese car, 
while pu ing anti-Japanese slogans on it.
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Figure 6: The police constructing “human walls” to separate the demonstrators into 
smaller groups.
Figure 7: The riot police guarding the Japanese Consulate.
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Figure 8: The riot police resisting charges from the demonstrators in front of the 
Japanese Consulate.
Figure 9: The demonstrators jamming the entire Hongqao Development Area. 
The tourist buses parking near Wandu Building ge ing ready for taking the 
demonstrators home.
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where. It was perversely like watching a game of basketball, with the 
baskets being the consulate windows.”
Despite the vandalism, Mark praised the police for doing a good 
job. He thought the police were at times a “helpful escort” in front 
of the procession. At other times, they were efficient marshals. “We 
reach Hongqiao and find ‘helpful’ police blocking the way, and essen-
tially making it impossible for us to get lost.” When the demonstrators 
tried to “rush the entrance” of the Consulate, the police performance 
was superb. “They [the demonstrators] tried several more times, and 
thankfully, the police were able to hold them off without resorting to 
violence.”
As a nonpartisan American observer, Mark was not concerned with 
the Chinese demands. He was nonetheless moved by the dedication of 
the mass of participants. He confessed, “What was most memorable 
about the whole afternoon was not the cause or messages themselves—
but it was just seeing the passion and energy of the (if only somewhat) 
unleased [sic] masses, young and old, male and female, wealthy and 
not-so-wealthy, all with one voice, one heart, and one cause. Whether it 
was from their hearts or not, I couldn’t judge—although I observe that 
probably 99.9% of the folks there didn’t actually live through that time 
of history. Still, it didn’t make a difference.”
C. Hong Kong
The anti-Japanese demonstrations in Hong Kong in April 2005 were 
uneventful and small in scale when compared with those in the main-
land. However, the Hong Kong protesters continued their fight in their 
blogs and by sending letters to the editors of influential local news-
papers. I will introduce their fights by drawing on the blog entitled, 
“Miss Kwok’s Secret Garden” (www.louisakwok.blogspot.com). The 
blogger, Louisa Kwok, is a young English teacher at a secondary school 
in Hong Kong. Louisa is Chinese, but refuses to call herself a patriot of 
China. “I have never been a patriot and will never be. Every year, I still 
protest against the June 4th massacre [in Beijing in 1989] and discuss 
the issue with my students, hoping that no one will forget what the 
Chinese government did to the innocent students in 1986 [sic]. We still 
have people coming out every year demanding the Chinese govern-
ment to redress the issue.”15
After the demonstrations in Hong Kong, Louisa debated with West-
ern journalists and scholars, such as Peter Kammerer and Tom Plate, 
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who urged China and Japan to move forward, not look backward, in 
order not to risk Asia’s peace and prosperity. Louisa did not concur. 
She raised a thoughtful question: “If Germany did not offer an official 
apology after the Second World War; its prime minister visited the 
grave of Hitler overtly and continually; and its government allowed 
the modification of history textbooks to whitewash the things it did to 
the Jews, could other European countries and the USA forget about the 
past and move on?” In her rebuttal to other critics, Louisa defended 
the protesters in China: “China does have its own unforgivable past 
but it doesn’t mean that anyone can deprive its people of expressing 
their anger towards the Japanese textbook incident. Condemning the 
Japanese whitewashing their atrocities during their invasion in China 
is what every citizen will do if he/she knows what really happened.”
Finally, Louisa endorsed the letter to the editor of the South China 
Morning Post written by Fion Yip, a Hong Kong resident, who addressed 
the issues raised in the Western columnists’ writings. Fion declared, 
“Whether the Chinese and Korean peoples forgive Japanese war crimi-
nals is a personal decision. But it is utterly wrong to try to forget what 
the Japanese did to China and other Asian countries. It is dangerous. If 
we do not learn from history, it will repeat itself.” She further defended 
the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China as legitimate and necessary, 
as long as the demonstrators did not resort to violence. She said, “The 
protests, as long as they remain under control and there is no serious 
damage, should not be suppressed.” Fion went on to stress, “Those 
who are sympathetic towards Japan should re-read the history of mas-
sacres, tortures and other war crimes. Given the complex international 
politics—China’s tricky relationship with the US, the Taiwan issue and 
so on—who can guarantee Japan will never invade China again? To 
expect no protests is even more dangerous to world peace. That’s why 
we all need to speak up.”
It is clear that the above narratives of the 2005 demonstrations in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong all show respect and sympathy 
for the passion and energy of the demonstrators. Some go further to 
defend the Chinese concerns as legitimate and rational in terms of 
maintaining world peace. These concerns are rooted in the dark pages 
of the history of Sino-Japanese relations. It is these concerns that drive 
the protesters to the street to air their grievances collectively. The Chi-
nese government does not seem to have a role in the process.
In this connection, I should mention the alleged story from more 
than one source that some demonstrators were released from work by 
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their Korean employers in China. To encourage their Chinese employ-
ees to participate in the demonstrations, some Korean employers 
offered double pay to the employees willing to join the demonstrations 
in Shanghai and other places.16
The narratives have confirmed that the demonstrations in China 
were largely orderly. Vandalism took place as a form of expressing 
anger. No looting was reported. The police were restrained in using 
force and did their job well. Despite their diversified backgrounds, 
the protesters from Beijing to Hong Kong were in solidarity in their 
goals, to quote from one narrative, being “all with one voice, one heart, 
and one cause.” The narratives seem to indicate that a new culture of 
social and political protest is being born in China because the protests 
in 2005, unlike their predecessors in history, ended without bloodshed 
and remained highly educational to the younger Chinese both at home 
and abroad.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Unlike in previous nationwide protests, the majority of the participants 
in the 2005 demonstrations seemed to be young people from the work-
ing class, although there were also many college students. Remarkably, 
the protesters were unorganized. There were no obvious leaders or 
organizers in the demonstrations. The forty-two protesters arrested in 
Shanghai in late April 2005, for instance, were largely working youths. 
They were charged with property damage or instigating protests by 
spreading demonstration schedules through their personal websites or 
mobile phones.17 None of the individuals was identified as a leader of 
the protests. The demonstrators might make a variety of demands in 
their slogans, but their shared goal was directed at Japan’s refusal to 
face up to history and act responsibly.
Were the anti-Japanese demonstrations spontaneous or stage-man-
aged? I used to believe the government stage-managed the events, 
as evidenced by the availability of buses at the terminal sites of the 
demonstrations. From the participants’ narratives and my interviews, 
I was surprised to learn that the government agencies, business firms, 
or schools provided the buses for a different reason that is not fully 
understood outside China. The buses were provided mainly for taking 
the participants back to their workplaces or campuses in an orderly 
and timely way. Most demonstrators had to find their own transporta-
tion to the demonstration sites. The free return trip was meant to be a 
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control measure, so as to disperse the demonstrators before they had 
any chance to create trouble.18 This is perhaps why Johan, the Swedish 
observer, said it only took half an hour to clear the final demonstration 
site in Beijing, because “the students left voluntarily without fuzz” for 
the free ride.19 I also learned from my interviewees that the adminis-
trators at schools were under constant pressure from the government 
to keep an eye on the student activists. In turn, the administrators 
demanded that professors and department chairs assume responsibil-
ity for keeping their students busy in the classrooms, laboratories, or 
libraries. One professor at Nanjing University told me that he received 
more than eight phone calls per day in early April 2005 from the uni-
versity administration to seek his help in discouraging students from 
joining the demonstrations.20
The demonstrations came at a time when the leadership in Bei-
jing finished undergoing a sharp change. By April 2005, President Hu 
Jintao was in the process of consolidating his power, after succeed-
ing Jiang Zemin in March 2003. He wanted to depart from Jiang’s 
high-handed policy in suppressing public protests (e.g., Falungong) 
by adopting a more tolerant, protective policy toward peaceful public 
protest on all issues. President Hu’s top priority is “Social Harmony.” 
This change accounts for the permissive attitude of the police. This 
is also the time when China surpassed the United States as Japan’s 
top trading partner for the first time, making Sino-Japanese relations 
vitally important to Japan.21 Japan and China have now become mutu-
ally dependent on each other for economic development. The Chinese 
protesters have no fear to air their grievances against the Japanese. 
Moreover, this is also the first time when the Chinese people can make 
use of electronic technology at a massive level for social and political 
activities, all thanks to the rapid growth of the economy in China in 
the last two decades. Increasingly, Chinese young people can afford to 
own mobile phones, notebook computers, and other electronic equip-
ments for communication. The popularity of electronic communication 
makes government control a more difficult task. As a result people are 
blessed with unprecedented freedom of speech.
The anti-Japanese protests in 2005 are admirably voluntary, stimu-
lating, and intrepid actions of the young people in defense of truth and 
justice in history that China seldom experiences in the last few decades. 
The protesters simply see their actions as straightforward reaction to 
the Japanese leaders’ attitudes toward wartime history as reflected in 
the Yasukuni Shrine, history textbooks and other unresolved issues 
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relating to Imperial Japan’s war crimes and atrocities during World 
War II. The Chinese have no intention to interfere with Japanese free-
dom of faith and speech, as they never protested against the Yasukuni 
Shrine before the official enshrinement of Tojo and other convicted war 
criminals in 1978 and Japan’s massive revision of history textbooks in 
1982. The Chinese stand is firm that worshipping war criminals or dis-
torting history is unacceptable. Pointedly, they find Premier Koizumi’s 
and other Japanese leaders’ conflicting views of history purposely mis-
leading, disturbing, and in need of correction.
Indeed, the Chinese protesters collectively take a bold excursion into 
a region of central importance, which many leaders in Japan and China 
either fear or disdain to confront.22 To these young protesters, history 
matters. With regard to Imperial Japan’s war crimes and responsi-
bilities, some Chinese may choose to forgive, but they can never forget. 
They are waiting to see sincerity and efforts from Japan toward redress 
and reconciliation. At the same time, these young protesters seem to 
be ready for another wave of protest if the response from Japan con-
tinues to be disappointing and irritating. For one thing, the internet 
and other communication technology in China increasingly continue 
to be helpful in their pursuit. The protesters do not need any engineers 
or organizers to guide or push them for actions. More than one young 
protesters in Shanghai whom I interviewed surprised me by being 
able to recite a part of the English mission statement of the Global 
Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia as follows: 
“For only from truth in history, can we secure justice for victims, safe-
guard humanity from repeating mistakes of the past, and bring about 
genuine reconciliation and lasting peace among all people.”23 They all 
pledged to support GA’s mission. It is my hope that the new Japanese 
leadership under Premier Abe will alleviate the coming of another 
wave of protest in China in the near future. The ball seems to be on 
Japan’s court now. •
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